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INTRODUCTION
Citizens United v. FEC1 is a decision some have decried as the worst Supreme
Court ruling of modern times—a democracy-destroying precedent that was the product
of conservative judicial activism.2 A mere six years after that decision, however, the
most prominent display of American democracy, the presidential election cycle, is
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 See Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Is an American Hero, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 28, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119578/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-retire
ment-feminists-jazzercise [http://perma.cc/M4JQ-BXM2] (detailing Justice Ginsburg’s desire
to overrule Citizens United because the decision “strays so far from what our democracy is
supposed to be”); see also Ramsey Cox, Franken: Citizens United Is One of the ‘Worst’
Rulings, HILL (Sept. 9, 2014, 12:27 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/217105
-franken-citizens-united-decision-is-worst-ever [http://perma.cc/336A-J2MZ] (reporting Sen.
Al Franken’s view that Citizens United is among the Supreme Court’s worst decisions).
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showing that those concerns likely were over-exaggerated.3 Contrary to the fears of
reformers who have predicted our democracy’s downfall, the 2016 primary election
cycle was marked by significant anti–super PAC sentiment and calls for campaign
finance reform.4 Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, both populist candidates, dis-
avowed super PACs,5 and the candidate with perhaps the most super PAC support
struggled to remain relevant and ultimately dropped out of the race.6 The 2016
presidential primaries are proof that the money available because of Citizens United
simply does not guarantee political success. What Citizens United does allow,
though, is another avenue for the expression of First Amendment political speech
rights. Rights that, with the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia, may quickly come
under attack.
The 2016 presidential election cycle has shown that campaign finance issues are
still in the public consciousness, but Justice Scalia’s unexpected death in February
2016 has shown that campaign finance issues are still of legal relevance too. Justice
Scalia, an ardent, stalwart supporter of political free speech rights, was part of the
five-justice voting bloc that decided many of the most influential campaign finance
decisions of the last decade.7 Those decisions struck down many of the contribution
limits that campaign finance reformers would like to see reinstated.8 Now, however,
3 Jack Shafer, Three Cheers for Citizens United!, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www
.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/citizens-united-2016-121739 [http://perma.cc/A43Z
-E7HM] (“But these expectations that big money would float the best-financed candidate
directly to the White House have yet to materialize this campaign season.”).
4 See Peter Overby, Presidential Candidates Pledge to Undo ‘Citizens United.’ But
Can They?, NPR (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466668949
/presidential-candidates-pledge-to-undo-citizens-united-but-can-they [http://perma.cc/AQC8
-H9VU] (discussing the salience of political spending in the 2016 election cycle for both
ends of the ideological spectrum).
5 See id. (“Like [Democrat Sen. Bernie] Sanders, [Republican] Donald Trump has made
money in politics one of the biggest targets of his campaign . . . .”).
6 See Shafer, supra note 3 (“On the Republican side, Jeb Bush has collected $120
million in donations to lead all Republicans in the money sweepstakes, yet he trails Donald
Trump badly in the polls.”); see also David S. Bernstein, How Dynasties Sank the GOP and
the Democrats, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02
/2016-elections-jeb-bush-dynasties-213682 [http://perma.cc/75UN-3967] (discussing Jeb
Bush’s impact on super PACs and his inability to turn super PAC support into a successful
campaign, which he ultimately suspended in mid-February 2016).
7 See, e.g., Associated Press, Scalia on Unlimited Political Ads: Turn off TV, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 21, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-on-unlimited-political-ads
-turn-off-tv/ [http://perma.cc/K4XQ-BZQZ] (discussing Scalia’s role in the Citizens United
decision and his “the more the merrier[ ]” approach to political free speech).
8 See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Scalia: Blame Congress for My Decision to Turn Campaign
Finance into the Wild West, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 23, 2012, 9:50 AM), https://thinkprogress
.org/scalia-blame-congress-for-my-decision-to-turn-campaign-finance-into-the-wild-west-a1a
9cb9e7291#.f7201a2v3 [http://perma.cc/QPV8-2EUU] (discussing how “Citizens United is
best remembered for opening the floodgates to corporate money in politics”).
376 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:373
despite Justice Scalia’s careful and patient tailoring of his dissenting opinions up
until the time he was finally able to join the Court’s majority in the mid-2000s,9
matters of campaign finance and restrictions on political speech have once again
taken center stage. The First Amendment freedoms for which Justice Scalia fought
for so long could be overturned by a reform-friendly appointee or a zealous lower
court seeking to take advantage of a deadlocked Supreme Court.10
This Note addresses a campaign finance issue on which the circuit courts are split,
namely, the permissibility of contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s independent-
expenditure arm. Part I of this Note provides a general background of the relatively
complex campaign finance law involved in the circuit split. Hybrid PACs and other
related organizations are entirely legal entities created either by statute or judge-made
law. Those entities are then subject to a variety of controls and restrictions including,
most importantly for this Note, contribution limits. Part II examines the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence from Buckley v. Valeo11 through McCutcheon
v. FEC12 and evaluates the likely outcome of future decisions based on past precedent
and the Justices’ leanings. Part II then scrutinizes the closely drawn standard as ap-
plied to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm. Finally, Part III suggests that
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Republican Party of New Mexico v.
King13 should be recognized as the best way to resolve the current circuit split to
ensure that overbroad, prophylactic contribution limits are not used to unconstitu-
tionally burden First Amendment political speech rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Political Action Committees
A political action committee (PAC) is an organization tailor-made for engaging
in political speech.14 PACs emerged in the mid-1940s because of two prominent
9 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (holding that the justifi-
cations for restricting corporate political speech do not apply to issue advocacy, partially
overturning McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and taking the first major step toward
Citizens United).
10 See Richard L. Hasen, How Scalia’s Death Could Shake up Campaign Finance, POLITICO
(Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-death-cam
paign-finance-reform-213633 [http://perma.cc/GQJ4-MC3Q] (noting ways in which Justice
Scalia’s death could impact campaign finance jurisprudence in the near future).
11 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
12 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
13 741 F.3d 1089, 1103 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a hybrid PAC’s dual nature does
not indicate an inherent corruption concern).
14 See L.B. WHEILDON, Campaign Spending and the Law, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS 1946, at 385–406 (1946).
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federal laws that limited political involvement: one that restricted individual political
contributions and another that banned labor union contributions.15 Since that time,
PACs have proliferated and become the preeminent vehicle for organizations—from
corporations to special interest groups—to engage in political speech.16 PACs today,
unlike early PACs, are subject to many restrictions.17 These restrictions largely
depend on which organizations, if any, are associated with a PAC and what sort of
political activity a PAC will engage in.18
A federal PAC can be formed as a separate segregated fund (SSF) or a non-
connected committee.19 SSFs and non-connected committees have differing reporting20
and solicitation requirements,21 as well as other regulatory differences.22 A non-
connected PAC may act either as a candidate-expenditure (traditional) PAC or an
independent expenditure-only23 (super) PAC. An SSF, however, may not act as a
15 See id. (considering early PACs to be the result of loopholes in federal campaign finance
law, specifically the Smith-Connally Act of 1943, which banned labor union election campaign
contributions, and the Hatch Act of 1940, which capped individual political contributions).
16 Are Super PACs Harming U.S. Politics?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.us
news.com/debate-club/are-super-pacs-harming-us-politics [http://perma.cc/75LA-623P] (dis-
cussing Super PAC activity post–Citizens United).
17 See generally Super PACs, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL., http://campaign freedom.org
/external-relations/super-pacs/ [http://perma.cc/QQ8S-QMCE] (describing the regulations to
which Super PACs are subject).
18 Id.
19 What Is a Political Action Committee?, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec
.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml#pac [http://perma.cc/V89K-H39G] (describing SSFs as “political
committees established and administered by corporations, labor unions, membership
organizations or trade associations . . . [that] can only solicit contributions from individuals
associated with connected or sponsoring organization[,]” and non-connected committees as
“committees . . . not sponsored by or connected to any of the aforementioned entities and . . .
free to solicit contributions from the general public”).
20 Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected PACs, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4FR-TAYT]
(noting that a non-connected PAC “must report all its operating and solicitation expenses[,]”
but an SSF does not need to report “fundraising or administrative expenses” if the connected
organization pays).
21 Id. (noting that non-connected PACs may accept contributions from the general public,
whereas SSFs are statutorily limited to certain donors, and are more restricted than non-
connected PACs in the manner in which they are permitted to solicit contributions).
22 Id. (indicating other variations between regulatory requirements for SSFs and non-
connected PACs, including registration and naming requirements).
23 Independent Expenditure-Only Committees, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www
.fec.gov/press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml [http://perma.cc/JT6K-DZCT] (defining an inde-
pendent expenditure as “spending by individuals, groups, political committees, corporations
or unions expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates.
These expenditures may not be made in . . . cooperation with, . . . a candidate, the candidate’s
campaign or a political party”).
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super PAC.24 These PAC designations are functions of federal election law and do
not reflect the additional federal and state laws by which political groups also must
abide.25 This Note will utilize federal PAC designations unless otherwise noted.26
B. Contribution Limits
Contribution limits are one way the states and federal government combat elec-
toral corruption.27 Buckley v. Valeo formed the basis for how contribution limits are
evaluated.28 Contributions, unlike expenditures, are considered to be more general
in nature and farther removed from the core of political speech.29 This does not
mean, however, that contributions are not due First Amendment protection.30
Contribution limits, despite invoking the First Amendment, are subject to interme-
diate, not strict, scrutiny.31 Contribution limits only need to be closely drawn to serve
a sufficiently important state interest.32 As long as contribution is not banned outright,
contribution limits are generally permissible33 because the act of contributing is
24 See Stop This Insanity Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015) (noting that an SSF is a “vehicle capable of soliciting
without transparency [ ]” and that those organizations that “wish[ ] to solicit freely” as super
PACs do, “must do so in the light[ ]”).
25 See Compliance with Laws Outside the FEC’s Jurisdiction, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/compliance_nonfec.shtml [http://perma.cc/9D8P-FMSN]
(listing numerous laws beyond the FEC’s jurisdiction with which political committees must
comply, perhaps most importantly, IRS tax law and state election law). Note that confusion
may arise from overlapping, or differing, state and federal terminology. See, e.g., Campaign
Contribution Limits Per Cycle 2015–2016 Election Cycle, ARIZ. SECRETARY ST., n.21, http://
www.azsos.gov/sites/azsos.gov/files/campaign_contribution_limits_7-21-2015.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9KD3-VLFQ] (noting the former use of the term “Super PAC” under ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 16-905(G), which was in conflict with the federal usage).
26 State laws are included later in this Note to show how PAC speech is regulated, not to
show the difference between federal and state PAC formation or terminology.
27 Expenditure limits and disclosure requirements are additional ways the government
combats corruption. See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 109.32 (2016) (federal coordinated party expendi-
ture limits); ALA. CODE § 17-5-8 (2015) (Alabama candidate and PAC campaign finance
disclosure requirements).
28 See 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (per curiam).
29 Id. (“By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures . . . , a limitation upon the amount
that any one person or group may contribute . . . entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”).
30 See infra Part III.
31 The Buckley Court attempted to apply the “exacting scrutiny” standard under which
restrictions on First Amendment speech rights are heavily scrutinized. See 424 U.S. at 16.
Expenditure and contribution limits, however, were ultimately evaluated under a bifurcated
standard based on the perceived value of each form of speech. See id. at 25 (indicating that
contributions are more like associational rights rather than pure speech rights).
32 See id. at 25.
33 But see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 237 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s contri-
bution limits because those limits were too low).
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considered to be the important speech element, not the amount of the contribution.34
There are notable exceptions to the general permissibility of contribution limits.
Contribution limits to independent-expenditure groups are impermissible,35 as are
aggregate contribution limits.36
The contribution limits most important to this Note are those limits on individual-
to-candidate contributions, individual-to-PAC contributions, and PAC-to-candidate
contributions. There are no individual-to-super-PAC contribution limits since those
committees do not coordinate with or contribute to candidates.37 Thus, PAC contri-
bution limits will indicate limits on traditional PACs unless otherwise specified.
1. Federal Contribution Limits
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) and the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) form the backbone of federal election contribution law.38
Individuals may contribute nearly twice as much to traditional PACs as compared to
candidate committees.39 PAC-to-candidate contributions vary depending on whether
that PAC supports multiple candidates.40 A multicandidate PAC may contribute nearly
twice as much to candidate committees as a non-multicandidate PAC.41
2. State Contribution Limits
Contribution limits vary greatly by state. Some states have flat contribution limits,
whereas others have tiered limits based on the office for which a candidate is running.42
Some states do not have contribution limits at all.43 Some states apply contribution
limits only for certain contributions, such as PAC-to-candidate contributions but not
34 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
35 See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that there is no
compelling government corruption concern to permit contribution limits on independent
expenditure-only groups), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010).
36 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456 (2014) (plurality opinion) (holding that
aggregate contribution limits violate the First Amendment).
37 See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–95 (noting that, just as independent expenditures
cannot be corrupt, neither can contributions to independent expenditure-only groups).
38 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A) (2012) (definition of contribution). See generally 52
U.S.C. § 30116 (2012) (contribution limits).
39 See Contribution Limits for 2015–2016 Federal Elections, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml [http://perma.cc/XG8X-24UF] (listing
federal individual-to-PAC $5,000 limit and individual-to-candidate $2,700 limit).
40 See id. (listing federal non-multicandidate PAC-to-candidate $2,700 limit and multi-
candidate PAC-to-candidate $5,000 limit).
41 See id.
42 See generally STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES 2015–2016 ELECTION
CYCLE, NCSL (2015) [hereinafter STATE LIMITS].
43 See id.
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individual-to-PAC contributions.44 There is a significant spectrum in the way states
address political contributions.
The least restrictive contribution states are those that have no contribution limits.
Most states that allow unlimited contributions do so for three important categories:
individual-to-candidate, PAC-to-candidate, and individual-to-PAC contributions.45
There are currently thirteen states that allow unlimited contributions, twelve of which
are unlimited for all individual and PAC contributions.46
The moderately restrictive contribution states are those that have limits on con-
tributions to candidates but not on contributions to PACs. These states vary greatly
in how candidate contributions are limited. All do allow, however, for unlimited
individual-to-PAC contributions.47 There are currently sixteen states that focus limits
on individual-to-candidate and PAC-to-candidate contributions.48
The most restrictive contribution states are those that limit both contributions
to candidates and contributions to PACs.49 These states, similar to the moderately
restrictive states, vary greatly in the way candidate contributions are limited. There
are currently twenty-one states that limit contributions at more than one juncture.50
C. Hybrid PACs
A hybrid PAC, as the name suggests, is a PAC created by combining into a
single organization the candidate contribution ability of a traditional PAC and the
44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 8010, 8012 (West 2016) (detailing contribution
limits for candidates and contribution limits generally).
45 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-2-4 to -12 (West 2016) (codifying very few contribution
limits). But see id. § 12-27-7 (2016) (individual-to-candidate limits); id. § 12-27-9 (individual-
to-PAC limits).
46 The least restrictive states include Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See STATE LIMITS,
supra note 42 (listing state contribution limits and the statutes in which those contribution
limits are found). South Dakota, which limits individual-to-candidate and individual-to-PAC
contributions, does not limit PAC-to-candidate contributions. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-
27-7 (2016) (individual-to-candidate limits); id. § 12-27-9 (individual-to-PAC limits).
47 See, e.g., tit. 15, §§ 8010, 8012 (detailing contribution limits for candidates and contri-
bution limits generally). But see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A. (West 2016) (creating
an individual-to-PAC contribution limit within twenty-one days prior to an election).
48 The moderately restrictive states include Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New York, Tennessee, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See STATE LIMITS, supra note 42.
49 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.070 (West 2016) (detailing the range of contribution
limits).
50 The most restrictive states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and West
Virginia. See STATE LIMITS, supra note 42.
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unlimited independent expenditure ability of a super PAC.51 Hybrid PACs gained
federal recognition after the 2011 D.C. District Court case Carey v. FEC.52 In Carey,
the court held that hybrid PACs were permissible, provided that distinct accounts
were maintained in order to keep hard money (for candidate contributions) and soft
money (for independent expenditures) separate.53
Simply because hybrid PACs are permitted to exist54 does not mean there is a
consensus about how such PACs are to operate. This Note addresses one of the
logistical concerns with hybrid PACs, namely, how to treat an individual’s contribution
to a hybrid PAC’s independent expenditure-only account. The way these contributions
are to be treated is currently the subject of a growing circuit split. Before describing
the circuit split, though, there is an important relationship to note between hybrid
PACs and enmeshed entities.
1. Enmeshed Entities
Enmeshed entities, similar to hybrid PACs, combine traditional PACs and super
PACs. The primary difference between enmeshed entities and a hybrid PAC is that
enmeshed entities are not a single organization but rather a group of organizations.55
A non-hybrid PAC pairing of a traditional PAC with a separate super PAC is the
most basic example of an enmeshed entity.56 Enmeshed entities, however, often take
a more complex form, such as a parent nonprofit corporation with an associated
traditional PAC and an associated super PAC.57
2. The Circuit Split: Are Hybrid PACs Inherently Coordinative?
Post–SpeechNow.org v. FEC,58 there is little disagreement that anti-corruption
concerns are insufficient to limit contributions to independent expenditure-only
51 See Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 136 (D.D.C. 2011). Hybrid PACs are also known
as Carey Committees. FEC TERMINOLOGY FOR CANDIDATE COMMITTEES, FEC (2013).
52 See 791 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
53 Id.
54 See id. Note, though, that Carey was merely a D.C. District Court decision with
significant federal implications only because the decision bound the FEC.
55 See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2014)
(discussing three legally distinct entities that were closely related).
56 See, e.g., Peter Overby, 5 Years After ‘Citizens United,’ SuperPACs Continue to Grow,
NPR (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/13/377024687/five-years-after
-citizens-united-superpacs-continue-to-grow [http://perma.cc/9PSB-8NKD] (discussing the
traditional and super PACs that former Florida governor Jeb Bush established before
announcing his candidacy for president in 2015).
57 See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 121–22 (addressing a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization
and its associated traditional and super PACs).
58 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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groups.59 Questions arise, however, when independent expenditure-only groups
begin to appear less independent. Some courts view hybrid PACs and enmeshed entities
as inherently less independent than isolated super PACs,60 and this has led to a circuit
split regarding contribution limits to hybrid entities. Some courts hold that maintain-
ing legal separation and segregated bank accounts is sufficient to overcome corruption
concerns.61 Other courts hold that those criteria do not necessarily prevent potential
coordination, which could lead to actual or apparent corruption.62 The Tenth Circuit
Court’s holding in King exemplifies the first view,63 and the Second Circuit Court’s
holding in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell64 exemplifies the second.65
a. Republican Party of New Mexico v. King: Independent Expenditures Are
Independent Unless Actually Impermissibly Coordinated
In King, New Mexico Turn Around (NMTA), a hybrid PAC, challenged a New
Mexico statute66 containing numerous political contribution limits, including limits on
individual-to-PAC contributions.67 NMTA argued that the statutory contribution limit68
on individual-to-PAC contributions was unconstitutional as applied to independent-
expenditure groups.69 The district court sided with NMTA and issued an injunction
against the provision that restricted contributions to independent-expenditure groups.70
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s injunction
because the court thought NMTA likely would succeed on the merits.71 The court
59 See id. at 694–95 (indicating that anti-corruption concerns cannot justify contribution
limits to independent expenditure-only groups); see also Wis. Right to Life State Political
Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 153, 155 (7th Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San
Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d
274, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2008).
60 See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143.
61 See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097, 1103 (10th Cir.
2013); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009); N.C. Right to Life, 525 F.3d at
305; Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 136 (D.D.C. 2011).
62 See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143; Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764
F.3d 409, 444 (5th Cir. 2014).
63 See King, 741 F.3d at 1097, 1103.
64 758 F.3d 118 (2d. Cir. 2014).
65 See id. at 143.
66 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.7 (West 2016).
67 See King, 741 F.3d at 1091.
68 § 1-19-34.7(A)(1) (prohibiting contributions from individuals to political committees
in excess of $5,000 during the primary election or $5,000 during the general election).
69 See King, 741 F.3d at 1091–92 (arguing that under Citizens United’s reasoning and
subsequent circuit court opinions, anti-corruption concerns do not overcome the political
speech rights underlying contributions to independent-expenditure groups).
70 Id. at 1092.
71 Id. at 1103.
2016] IF IT LOOKS LIKE A SUPER PAC 383
noted that a hybrid PAC’s dual nature does not indicate an inherent corruption concern:
the candidate contribution side does not implicate the independent-expenditure side,
nor is there an implied coordination.72 The court also discussed that individual-to-
PAC contribution limits were unnecessary to combat corruption because existing
candidate contribution limits (individual-to-candidate and PAC-to-candidate) and
anti-coordination laws sufficiently mitigated corruption concerns.73 The court held
that the New Mexico statute,74 as applied, would likely be unconstitutional because,
even if independent-expenditure contribution limits were permissible, New Mexico’s
contribution limits did not appear closely drawn to the state’s anti-corruption interest.75
b. Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell: Independent
Expenditures May Appear Impermissibly Coordinated and That Makes
Contribution Limits Permissible
In Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, Vermont Right to Life Com-
mittee—Fund for Independent Political Expenditures (VRLC-FIPE), a super PAC,
contested a Vermont law76 imposing contribution limits on all political committees.77
Vermont Right to Life Committee, a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization, created both
VRLC-FIPE and VRLC Political Committee (VRLC-PC), a traditional PAC.78 The
two PACs were legally separate and maintained separate bank accounts.79 VRLC-
FIPE contended that contribution limits as applied to super PACs were an unconsti-
tutional abridgement of speech.80 The Second Circuit evaluated contribution limits
only as applied to VRLC-FIPE.81
Like the Tenth Circuit in King,82 the Second Circuit in Sorrell did not state
explicitly that contribution limits would be unconstitutional as applied to super
72 Id. at 1101 (noting that Citizens United established that “independent expenditures are
by definition uncoordinated,” thus additional associated coordination is required to invoke
corruption concerns).
73 Id.
74 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.7(A)(1) (West 2016).
75 King, 741 F.3d at 1103.
76 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (“A political committee . . . shall not accept
contributions totaling more than $2,000.00 from a single source, political committee or
political party in any two-year general election cycle.”).
77 758 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2014).
78 Id. at 122.
79 Id. at 143.
80 Id. at 121.
81 Id. at 139 (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 381 F.3d 91, 140 (2d Cir. 2004)) (holding that it is
“unquestionably constitutional” to limit contributions to traditional PACs). But see Randall
v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s contribution limits because
those limits were too low).
82 See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1103 (10th Cir. 2013).
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PACs.83 The court, instead, held that VRLC-FIPE was not sufficiently independent
to be a super PAC.84 VRLC-FIPE’s separate bank account and declared super PAC
status, according to the court, were not compelling enough measures to prevent
coordination, which triggers at least the appearance of corruption.85 In determining
that VRLC-FIPE was not sufficiently independent, or “functionally distinct,” the
court applied a totality of the circumstances test.86 The court noted that this test did
not presume a traditional PAC and a super PAC were identical, rather, the test weighed
evidence for and against finding the two entities to be functionally distinct.87 The
court determined that VRLC-FIPE was not functionally distinct from VRLC-PC
because VRLC-FIPE “presented no evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact about its independence.”88 The court held, ultimately, that contribution limits
on VRLC-FIPE were permissible because VRLC-FIPE was not functionally distinct
from VRLC-PC, which maintained sufficiently close candidate relationships.89
II. RESOLVING THE SPLIT: WHY PRECEDENT, POLITICS, AND GOOD LEGAL
SENSE PROHIBIT BROAD, PROPHYLACTIC CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ON A
HYBRID PAC’S INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE-ONLY ARM
This Note argues that limiting contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-
expenditure account is impermissible for two reasons. First, based on the Roberts
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and the Court’s ongoing libertarian activ-
ism, the scope of permissible concerns about the appearance of corruption will continue
to narrow. This will significantly limit the opportunity for any restrictions based on
the mere appearance of corruption.90
Second, even if concerns about the appearance of corruption continue to be
compelling, then limiting contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent expenditure
account would still be an impermissible burden on speech.
83 See Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 140.
84 Id. at 141, 144–45 (holding that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC were “enmeshed finan-
cially and organizationally”).
85 Id. at 142 (expressing concern about coordination in the use of information). But see
King, 741 F.3d at 1097 (indicating that maintaining a segregated account prevents imper-
missible coordination).
86 See Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 142, 145 (noting factors weighing against being functionally
distinct, including “the overlap of staff and resources, the lack of financial independence, the
coordination of activities, and the flow of information between the entities”).
87 Id. at 144.
88 Id. (implying that maintaining separate bank accounts and being legally separate do
not “raise a genuine dispute of material fact about . . . independence”).
89 Id. at 145 (noting Supreme Court decisions upholding contribution limitations due to
close candidate relationships).
90 But see Hasen, supra note 10 (discussing the impact Justice Scalia’s death may have
on campaign finance jurisprudence going forward).
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A. The Decline of the Appearance of Corruption as a Compelling Government
Interest Sufficient to Restrict Political Speech
PACs are, fundamentally, vessels for exercising political speech. The money
contributed to PACs and the money PACs spend, ideally, would serve only that
purpose, though that is not always the case. A 2011 Harvard University study found
that the mere mention of money can lead to an increase in both unethical intentions
and outcomes.91 The government, both at the state and federal levels, long has held
that large sums of money can, perhaps nefariously, influence electoral outcomes.92
Combatting corruption, accordingly, is a well-known compelling government interest
in regulating PAC activity that would otherwise elicit First Amendment protection.
What qualifies as “corruption” varies greatly despite the Supreme Court’s nar-
rowing of the term to include only quid pro quo corruption.93 The federal government,
the states, and even the public, all seem to have significantly different ideas of what
corruption looks like in the political process.94
Since Buckley, anti-corruption concerns have always included awareness of the
problem of actual corruption and the problem of the appearance of corruption.95
Corruption is obviously the concrete evil, but the appearance of corruption can be
just as damaging as corruption itself.96 Despite the seemingly substantial concern
surrounding the appearance of corruption, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
has begun to weaken the appearance of corruption as a legitimate government
interest. That recent jurisprudence, however, is in line with the political direction the
Court has been heading in since Buckley, a direction that may result in an outcome
like what Justice Thomas has long envisioned.
91 See Maryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a
Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 53, 53, 60 (2013) (“[M]ere exposure to money can trigger unethical
intentions and behavior . . . .”).
92 See, e.g., The Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (2012))
(detailing Congress’s first attempt to regulate federal campaign finance by prohibiting corpora-
tions and national banks from contributing directly to presidential or congressional campaigns).
93 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–61 (2010) (stating that the government
anti-corruption interest is limited to quid pro quo corruption).
94 See Jordan May, Note, “Are We Corrupt Enough Yet?” The Ambiguous Quid Pro Quo
Corruption Requirement in Campaign Finance Restrictions, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 358–59
(2015) (highlighting the difference between the public’s and the Supreme Court’s conception
of what corruption is).
95 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (validating FECA’s purpose
to limit actual and apparent corruption).
96 See Richard L. Hasen, Opening the Political Money Chutes, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/04/07/opening-the-political-money-chutes/ [http://
perma.cc/9GMY-8RSS] (discussing the implications of McCutcheon and why preventing the
appearance of corruption is as important as preventing actual corruption).
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1. McCutcheon v. FEC Opened the Door to Significantly Narrowing the
Opportunity for Contribution Limits
In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court brought to light a potentially con-
cerning proposition: given the narrowed definition of corruption, certain contribution
limits may no longer be properly tailored.97 Though the Court’s holding was limited
to finding aggregate contribution limits impermissible, the Court made clear that
preventing quid pro quo corruption is a narrow interest and the government has no
business regulating political speech beyond that narrow purpose.98 Where Citizens
United highlighted the new (or reestablished) quid pro quo corruption standard,
McCutcheon made explicit that the quid pro quo standard also applied to the appear-
ance of corruption.99 These views reflect a significant departure from certain prior
Supreme Court cases that upheld more expansive notions of corruption.100
2. Corruption Concerns: Transitioning Majority Jurisprudence Amidst Shifting
Political Tides
Beginning with Buckley in 1976, the Court began its still-ongoing struggle to bal-
ance First Amendment political speech protections with government anti-corruption
interests.101 Though the Court’s jurisprudence on the matter has altered course signifi-
cantly in the past few decades, any changes were largely foreseeable based on individ-
ual Justices’ political tendencies and sympathies.102
97 See 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“If there is no corruption concern
in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate
can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime.”).
98 Id. at 1441 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that, beyond restrictions directed at quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance, the government should not introduce restrictions that
could affect election outcomes).
99 Id. at 1451 (plurality opinion) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360
(2010)) (“[B]ecause the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption
is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not
seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”).
100 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143–44, 154 (2003).
101 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (establishing the
framework under which subsequent campaign finance cases were decided).
102 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485 (2012) (concluding that much of the conservative judicial activism
leading up to and including Citizens United was the result of the Justices’ personal preferences).
Note that the following cases did not address exactly the same issues. The shift in priorities,
however, is clear: the Roberts Court majority is far more interested in protecting political
speech and the marketplace of ideas, despite the long-standing corruption concerns first
enumerated in Buckley.
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a. 1976: Buckley v. Valeo
Buckley signaled the start of Supreme Court jurisprudence weighing government
anti-corruption concerns against constitutionally protected political speech in the
form of money spent to influence elections.103 In a per curiam decision, with only
one dissenter, the Buckley Court laid the groundwork for evaluating the constitution-
ality of political speech restrictions, such as contribution limits, when there was a
compelling government interest involved.104 In Buckley, the only compelling interest
was corruption, and the most blatant form of corruption is quid pro quo corrup-
tion.105 But the Buckley Court seemed to go beyond mere quid pro quo corruption
to include concerns about undue influence as well because such influence could give
way to at least the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.106
b. 1990: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
First Amendment protections for corporate speech became, as one might expect,
increasingly important to the Court as it became more conservative and libertarian,
favoring an open marketplace of ideas unencumbered by government interference.107
Before Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,108 there was a major shift in the
Court’s political makeup.109 Justice O’Connor, a conservative, and Justice Kennedy,
an ardent supporter of the First Amendment,110 replaced the more centrist Justices
Stewart and Powell.111 The Court also experienced a significant internal shift when
Justice Rehnquist rose to the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Burger’s
103 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24–28.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 26–28.
106 Id. at 27 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO,
413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)) (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption . . . . Congress could legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical[.]’”).
107 See Stone, supra note 102, at 486–87.
108 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
109 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 781–84 (2009) (analyzing empirical data to determine
Supreme Court Justices’ political leanings).
110 See Kevin Johnson, Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment: The Pivotal
Supreme Court Justice, NAT’L COMM. ASS’N (Oct. 2011), https://www.natcom.org/Comm
CurrentsArticle.aspx?id=1794 [http://perma.cc/S6RM-3PAZ] (noting Justice Kennedy’s
“belief in the First Amendment as the protector of freedoms that are essential to a robust and
unfettered democratic process”).
111 See Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 782 (ranking Justice O’Connor slightly more
conservative than Justices Powell and Kennedy, but all three far more conservative than
Justice Stewart).
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departure.112 Justice Scalia, a staunch conservative libertarian, filled Justice Rehnquist’s
Associate Justice vacancy.113 Austin, as a result, was decided on a slimmer majority
than Buckley, with the three new justices dissenting.114
Anti-corruption jurisprudence reached well beyond simple quid pro quo corrup-
tion in Austin, despite the increase in dissenting voices. The Austin Court acknowl-
edged a greater source of corruption, namely, the corporations that had amassed
wealth to influence elections in their favor.115 That Court, however, did limit its more
expansive notion of corruption by noting that no corruption concern could warrant
“prohibiting overt advocacy for or against a political candidate.”116
c. 2003: McConnell v. FEC
The Court, arguably, became even more conservative and libertarian post-
Austin.117 This change was felt in more recent cases, including McConnell v. FEC
in 2003, which was decided on the thinnest of majorities, with largely predictable
dissenting voices.118
Despite the McConnell Court’s growing conservative and libertarian bloc, the
Court continued to uphold a definition of corruption broader than mere quid pro quo
112 See id. (indicating that Chief Justice Rehnquist was among the most conservative of
all Justices in the past seventy years). But see Clements, infra note 118 (indicating Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s conservatism did not always extend to corporate speech rights).
113 See Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 782 (indicating Justice Scalia was one of the
most conservative Justices).
114 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990); id. at 669–78
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 679–95 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); id. at 695–713 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justices O’Connor and Scalia joined Justice
Kennedy’s dissent. Id. at 695. Chief Justice Rehnquist, notably, joined the opinion of the
Court. Id. at 654 (majority opinion).
115 Id. at 660 (majority opinion) (noting “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form . . . that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”).
116 Id. at 683.
117 See Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 782–83 (indicating that this transition in-
cluded the departure of two decidedly liberal Justices (Brennan and Marshall), a centrist
Justice (White), and a moderately liberal Justice (Blackmun); and the arrival of two decidedly
liberal Justices (Ginsburg and Breyer), an incredibly conservative Justice (Thomas), and a
moderately liberal Justice (Souter, as compared to his predecessor, Justice Brennan)).
118 See generally 540 U.S. 93 (2003). Perhaps the only unpredictable swap was Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissenting and Justice O’Connor joining the majority. Rehnquist’s depar-
ture from his position in Austin may be understood to reflect his unique conservative leanings,
which did not include corporate sympathies. See Jeff Clements, The Conservative Versus the
Corporatist: Justice Rehnquist’s Opposition to Justice Powell’s Drive to Create “Corporate
Speech” Rights, ACS BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the -conservative
-versus-the-corporatist-justice-rehnquist%E2%80%99s-opposition-to-justice-powell%E2
%80%99s [http://perma.cc/K2R7-MWLQ].
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corruption (or its appearance).119 The McConnell Court’s jurisprudence was compa-
rable to, and relied upon, Austin.
d. Citizens United and McCutcheon: The Return to “Buckley”
Only two years after McConnell, the Court’s political tide shifted again, opening
the door for a more restricted definition of corruption.120 Likely the most significant
change prior to Citizens United was Chief Justice Roberts replacing Chief Justice
Rehnquist.121 Chief Justice Roberts, unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, but like Justice
Kennedy, has shown himself to be less a voice for conservatism and more an ardent
free speech proponent and libertarian.122 Citizens United, and later McCutcheon,
signaled a shift from a narrow majority erring on the side of government anti-
corruption concerns to a narrow majority that instead erred on the side of First
Amendment protection.123
119 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (“[I]n speaking of ‘improper influence’ and ‘oppor-
tunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we [have] recognized a concern
not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000)); see also FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
120 See Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 782 (finding Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito more conservative, on average, than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor).
121 But see Stone, supra note 102, at 487 (indicating that the most significant change was
Justice Alito replacing Justice O’Connor). Justice O’Connor, however, was arguably more
concerned about money in judicial elections, not elections generally, so in certain key cases
(like Austin) she and Justice Alito may have been aligned. See Adam Liptak, Former Justice
O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/01/27/us/politics/27judge.html?_r=0 (citing Justice O’Connor’s concerns
about Citizens United’s implications on judicial impartiality). The other change, Justice
Sotomayor replacing Justice Souter, was politically neutral. See Landes & Posner, supra note
109, at 782 (listing Justice Souter as moderately liberal); David Savage, Sotomayor Votes
Reliably with Supreme Court’s Liberal Wing, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2010), http://articles.la
times.com/2010/jun/08/nation/la-na-court-sotomayor-20100609 [http://perma.cc/HS5G-CMH8]
(noting that Justice Sotomayor is no less liberal than Justice Souter was).
122 Some pundits have gone so far as to label Chief Justice Roberts a corporatist, the very
antithesis of that for which Chief Justice Rehnquist often stood. See, e.g., Clements, supra
note 118 (stating the Roberts Court introduced a “new corporate rights doctrine”).
123 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (plurality opinion). Justice Kagan
replacing Justice Stevens did nothing to change the Court’s direction, thus the outcome in
McCutcheon mirrored that of Citizens United. See Linda Greenhouse, Speaking Truth to the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion
/speaking-truth-to-the-supreme-court.html (according to Justice Stevens, Justice Kagan’s
opinions represent his own “far more articulate[ly] and persuasive[ly] than anything that [he]
might have written”).
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The evolution of the new quid pro quo definition of corruption in Citizens
United and McCutcheon reflects a view even narrower than that of Buckley, the very
precedent the Court has cited in developing the narrower corruption standard.124
Though the Citizens United Court explicitly upheld preventing the appearance of
corruption as a compelling interest, the reality seems to betray that notion.125
Quid pro quo corruption is necessarily a direct arrangement, requiring the
transfer of some “quid” in exchange for some “quo.”126 If such a situation were
possible, then concern for either quid pro quo corruption or its appearance would be
valid; if such a situation were not possible, there would be no valid concern.
In practice, the opportunity for quid pro quo corruption to arise is limited. The
Court has gone so far as to say that even successful political ingratiation would not
constitute corruption.127 The quid pro quo corruption standard requires something
concrete (actual corruption), or at least something that conceivably could be con-
crete (the appearance of corruption).128 The appearance of quid pro quo corruption
cannot exist beyond the scope of those instances in which actual corruption may
exist. Actual quid pro quo corruption requires involvement with a candidate; thus, for
there to be the appearance of corruption, there must be involvement with a candidate.129
As the appearance of corruption standard narrows in scope, so too does legisla-
tures’ ability to tailor meaningful political speech regulations, especially regulations
that treat expenditures and contributions differently. A breakdown in the distinction be-
tween expenditures and contributions as political speech would seem to give credence
to Justice Thomas’s opinion that the time has come to chop down the Buckley tree.130
124 Buckley, at times, seems to stand in direct contrast to the Roberts Court’s definition of
corruption. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (“In Buckley, we expressly rejected the argument
that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA’s contribution limits,
noting that such laws ‘deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
1, 28 (1976) (per curiam))); cf. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (plurality opinion) (“[B]e-
cause the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined
to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the
appearance of mere influence or access.”).
125 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (stating that in Buckley, the
appearance of corruption was confined to quid pro quo).
126 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (noting the likely
bounds of anti-corruption regulation).
127 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
128 See id. at 359.
129 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (stating that Congress’s
anti-corruption interest “provides a basis for regulating federal candidates’ and officeholders’
receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received them”).
130 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1464 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[W]hat remains of Buckley is a rule without a rationale.”). See generally Marc
E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373 (2014) (dis-
cussing the “depiction of Buckley as an unsteady tree teetering before its final collapse”).
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3. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence in McCutcheon: The Not-So-Implausible
Extreme for Contribution Limit Jurisprudence
Justice Thomas has long been the Court’s most steadfast proponent of libertarian
free speech rights, at least in the campaign finance context.131 He strongly believes
that “[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection and the
lifeblood of a self-governing people.”132 Accordingly, campaign finance, as an ex-
pression of political speech, is due the utmost First Amendment protection.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in McCutcheon is the latest in a long line of
opinions in which he denounced the Buckley Court’s differing standard of review
for campaign contributions compared to campaign expenditures.133 Contributions,
according to Thomas, should be subject to the same strict scrutiny as expenditures.134
Thomas indicated that the only remaining rationale for the bifurcated standards
cannot logically stand post-McCutcheon.135 That rationale, that contribution speech
value is merely symbolic and not related to the amount given, seems to stand in
contrast with the crux of Chief Justice Roberts’s McCutcheon plurality opinion.136
To justify doing away with aggregate contribution limits, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the plurality, proclaimed that such limits were unconstitutionally burden-
some because broader political participation necessarily reduced the amount that
could be contributed to each candidate.137 But, if limiting the breadth of political
contribution is unconstitutionally burdensome, why is limiting the depth of political
contribution not similarly burdensome? Justice Thomas indicated that both contrib-
uting to many candidates and contributing a significant amount to one candidate are
ways for someone to robustly exercise his political speech rights.138 To continue to
limit contribution amounts would be to impermissibly penalize that exercise.139
131 See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462–63 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(declaring that Buckley’s differing standards for campaign contributions and expenditures under-
cut core speech rights); cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that students do not have a constitutional right to free speech in public schools).
132 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing FEC
v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465–66 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 See id. (listing Justice Thomas’s past opinions that have condemned Buckley). See Part
II.A, supra, for information about the differing standards under Buckley.
134 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640–41 (1996)).
135 See id.
136 See id. at 1445 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Court had no reason to revisit Buckley’s
bifurcated standard despite invalidating the rationale as applied to aggregate contribution limits).
137 See id. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others
because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on
broader participation . . . .”).
138 See id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
139 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008) (barring the government from penalizing
an individual “robustly exercis[ing]” his speech rights).
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For Justice Thomas, Buckley’s distinction between contributions and expendi-
tures is “a rule without a rationale.”140 That may be true, but even if Buckley’s distinc-
tion is overruled, contributions still will be inherently more closely related to the
recognized compelling anti-corruption government interest.141 This would mean that
contribution limits likely would continue to be more tenable than expenditure limits.
Simply because contribution limits would be more tenable, however, does not
mean that such limits would be as broad in scope as they are now. If contribution
restrictions are elevated to strict scrutiny review, the outcome actually could be
directly in line with the Court’s political momentum. Strict scrutiny of contribution
limits would almost certainly do away with any limits that are not narrowly tailored
to preventing situations in which quid pro quo corruption could arise.142
B. Even if Combatting the Appearance of Corruption Continues to Be
Compelling and Contribution Limits Are Subject to Lesser Scrutiny, Any
Limits on Contributions to a Hybrid PAC’s Independent-Expenditure Arm
Are Still Unconstitutional
Limits on contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm are un-
constitutional even if contribution limits are subject to mere intermediate scrutiny,143
and combatting corruption’s appearance is a compelling interest. Such contribution
limits are unconstitutional because they are not closely drawn.144 Though the govern-
ment interest in combatting corruption is sufficiently important, the restrictions are
overly burdensome.145
140 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
141 See Brad Smith, The Meaning of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, and Buckley’s
Contribution/Expenditure Distinction, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (July 31, 2013), http://
www.campaignfreedom.org/2013/07/31/the-meaning-of-corruption-in-campaign-finance-law
-and-buckleys-contributionexpenditure-distinction/ [http://perma.cc/L537-269M] (“Contribu-
tions are not subject to lower scrutiny because they are contributions, but because they offer
a greater chance for quid pro quo corruption.”).
142 As noted at the end of Part II.A.2, supra, the Court’s narrowing definition of corruption
to include only quid pro quo corruption suggests that the only logical place to introduce
limits (either expenditure or contribution) is in situations where such corruption could ac-
tually occur. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010) (indicating that the
government does not have a compelling anti-corruption interest if quid pro quo corruption
is not possible).
143 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Justice Thomas’s push to make contribution limits
subject to strict scrutiny).
144 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (stating
that rights of political association may be interfered with only if the State “employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of . . . freedoms”).
145 See infra Part II.B.
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1. Unlimited Contributions to a Hybrid PAC’s Independent-Expenditure Arm
Should Be Permitted Under SpeechNow
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court established, unequivocally, that inde-
pendent expenditures are, by definition, uncoordinated and non-corrupting.146 In
SpeechNow, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals extended that rationale to apply also
to the contributions that fund those independent expenditures.147 Put simply, the
government has no valid interest in restricting independent expenditures and so
neither does it have a valid interest in restricting the funding of those expendi-
tures.148 A hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is, by its very existence, an
uncoordinated and non-corrupting entity.149 Such independent expenditures do not
warrant different treatment merely because they coexist with the same hybrid PAC’s
candidate contribution arm.150 This notion, however, is not universally accepted.151
Those who believe that contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure
arm may be restricted rely upon the idea that hybrid PACs are ripe for improper
activity that would empower individuals to circumvent valid contribution limits.152
This belief relies on several flawed notions.
The first flawed notion is that individuals could abuse the hybrid PAC structure
by contributing to the independent-expenditure arm, which would then pass the
money along to the candidate contribution arm. If this were to happen, however,
quid pro quo corruption still would not be possible. A hybrid PAC’s candidate
contributions are capped, just like a traditional PAC’s.153 Contribution to either arm
of a hybrid PAC requires disclosure, so an individual could not circumvent valid
contribution limits in this way.154
146 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
147 See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (indicating that anti-
corruption concerns cannot justify contribution limits to independent expenditure-only groups).
148 See id.
149 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
150 See Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A[n] [organization] that makes
expenditures to support federal candidates does not suddenly forfeit its First Amendment
rights when it decides also to make direct contributions to parties or candidates.”).
151 See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2014).
152 See id. (holding that contribution limits were permissible because an independent-
expenditure group was “enmeshed financially and organizationally” with a candidate-
contribution group); Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2013)
(referring to the state’s anti-circumvention argument based on the idea that hybrid PACs are
differently situated).
153 See FEC TERMINOLOGY FOR CANDIDATE COMMITTEES, supra note 51 (“The [contribution
account] is subject to all of the limits and prohibitions of [FECA]. . . .”).
154 See id. Additionally, individuals may not control multiple PACs, so circumvention is
not possible via controlling multiple PACs’ candidate support. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434, 1453–54 (2014) (plurality opinion) (discussing anti-proliferation rules); see also
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The second flawed notion is that a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm
is somehow more likely to impermissibly coordinate with a candidate. Hybrid PACs,
however, are subject to the same anti-coordination laws as other independent-
expenditure groups.155 Preventing impermissible candidate coordination is a valid
government interest, but any restrictions must be properly tailored to that interest.156
Simply because a hybrid PAC performs two legal speech functions in close proximity
does not suddenly mean that that PAC will act illegally. Contribution limits are
inherently contrary to a hybrid PAC’s First Amendment speech rights with regard
to independent expenditures, so a restriction beyond preexisting anti-coordination
laws would be “heavy-handed” and not likely to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
speech rights.157
2. If Not Evaluated Like Contribution Limits in SpeechNow, Then Limits on
Contributions to a Hybrid PAC’s Independent-Expenditure Arm Should at Least
Be Evaluated as Necessarily Different Than Contribution Limits on Traditional
PAC or Candidate Contributions
Even if a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is not identically situated
to a typical independent-expenditure group (i.e., a super PAC), a hybrid PAC’s
independent-expenditure arm is still more similar to a super PAC than it is to a
traditional PAC. Contributions to both super and traditional PACs are subject to the
“closely drawn” standard. The government anti-corruption interest, however, is sig-
nificantly stronger for traditional PACs compared to super PACs (for which the
interest is nonexistent). If a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is deemed
to be inherently negatively affected by its close proximity to the candidate contribu-
tion arm, then that influence is not so severe as to invoke the full strength of the
government anti-corruption interest.158
infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the redundancies that undercut the usefulness of contribution
limits as a way of preventing circumvention in hybrid PACs).
155 See FEC TERMINOLOGY FOR CANDIDATE COMMITTEES, supra note 51.
156 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (plurality opinion) (explaining that, for contri-
bution limits, the limits must be reasonably and narrowly tailored to the government’s interest).
157 See id. at 1446 (noting that “indiscriminate” limits are “heavy-handed” because other
more targeted measures are in use).
158 See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 141 (2d Cir. 2014) (re-
interpreting Citizens United’s holding that independent expenditures cannot give rise to quid
pro quo corruption because of the inherent absence of prearrangement and coordination, to
mean that there must be an inherent prevention of prearrangement and coordination to avoid
corruption). In fact, the Supreme Court highlighted the lack of prearrangement and coordi-
nation because, without those aspects, expenditures are not as valuable to candidates. See
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454 (plurality opinion) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 357 (2010)). Prearrangement and coordination can be mitigated, however, without
burdening a specific vehicle for speech. See id. at 1439 (noting base contribution limits and
anti-proliferation laws as more targeted prevention measures).
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Independent expenditures do not invoke the government anti-corruption interest.
A hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm exists to make independent expendi-
tures, despite any increased chance for coordination or circumvention of contribu-
tion limits.159 A hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm, thus, should be treated
as much like a typical independent-expenditure group as possible. This means that
contribution limits, if applied to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm, likely
would not be closely drawn to the government anti-corruption interest because that
interest is significantly weaker for a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm.160
Limits on contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm serve
only one purpose, to prevent improper candidate coordination that may be more
likely to occur in a hybrid PAC.161 This increased likelihood of coordination, how-
ever, does not approach the coordination levels of traditional PACs, which, by defi-
nition, are coordinated with candidates.162 Traditional PAC contribution limits may
be closely drawn to the government interest in preventing traditional PAC corruption,
but those same limits would be wildly out of proportion to the relatively weak anti-
coordination interest associated with a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm.
Accordingly, even if a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is not identically
situated to a super PAC, that arm likely still should not be subject to the relatively
strong traditional PAC contribution limits.
3. Neither Limits on Individual-to-PAC Contributions nor Limits on
Contributions to a Hybrid PAC’s Independent-Expenditure Arm Are
Closely Drawn Because the Limits Are Heavy-Handed and Substantially
Mismatched to the Government’s Interest
If contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm invoke the
government anti-circumvention interest to the same degree as contributions to
traditional PACs, then the hybrid PAC independent-expenditure arm contribution
159 See Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 141 (indicating that hybrid PACs have an increased oppor-
tunity for impermissible activity, though also noting that the courts disagree on what should
be done to mitigate this opportunity).
160 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion) (stating that a contribution limit
must be closely drawn to the government’s anti-corruption interest to be permissible and a
“substantial mismatch” between that interest and the burdens imposed would indicate the
limit was not closely drawn).
161 The other potential reason for contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s independent-
expenditure arm, preventing circumvention of other limits, was foreclosed earlier in this Note.
See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that PAC-to-candidate contribution limits already stop this kind
of circumvention and disclosure will expose any donor that is attempting to circumvent).
162 The Supreme Court tends to delineate levels of coordinative behavior when deter-
mining whether a restriction is constitutional. See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741
F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 2013) (detailing instances where the Supreme Court found
coordinated expenditures to be, essentially, indirect candidate contributions).
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limits still would not be closely drawn. In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts dis-
cussed how statutory safeguards have improved significantly since Buckley.163 Those
improved statutes and regulations are much more targeted and have made broad,
prophylactic measures, such as aggregate limits, no longer constitutionally permissi-
ble.164 Roberts’s reasoning suggests that redundant restrictions are not tenable, even
under the looser “closely drawn” standard.165 So long as base contribution limits166
are protected, any additional protections designed to serve that purpose will be un-
constitutionally burdensome.
Over half the states do not impose individual-to-PAC contribution limits.167 The
remaining states (with one exception)168 and the federal government impose both
individual-to-PAC and PAC-to-candidate contribution limits.169 Utilizing both levels
of contribution limits appears, at least facially, redundant. Individual-to-PAC contribu-
tion limits do not serve the government anti-corruption interest directly but, rather,
are aimed at preventing circumvention of base contribution limits. In light of Chief
Justice Roberts’s reasoning in McCutcheon, these redundant contribution limits may
no longer be permissible, even as a means to combat circumvention of base limits.170
This should not be a problem, however, because most jurisdictions either already use
more targeted safeguards against circumvention or can adopt those safeguards men-
tioned in McCutcheon.
The Supreme Court has yet to answer the question of whether individual-to-PAC
contribution limits are constitutionally impermissible.171 However, as the govern-
ment anti-corruption interest has narrowed to include only quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance, the government’s anti-circumvention interest necessarily also has
narrowed.172 The availability of various, more targeted anti-circumvention measures,
163 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437–38 (plurality opinion).
164 See id. at 1446 (describing aggregate limits as “heavy-handed” in the presence of more
targeted measures).
165 See id. (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated
objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the
‘closely drawn’ test.”).
166 Base contribution limits are those limits on contributions directly made to candidates.
167 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8012 (West 2016) (PAC-to-candidate contribution
limits but no individual-to-PAC contribution limits); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-2-4 to -12
(West 2016) (no individual-to-PAC contribution limits).
168 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-27-7 to -9 (2016) (individual-to-candidate and
individual-to-PAC limits but no PAC-to-candidate limits).
169 See STATE LIMITS, supra note 42.
170 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446 (plurality opinion) (describing aggregate limits
as “heavy-handed” in the presence of more targeted measures).
171 See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting
the Supreme Court’s recent contribution limit jurisprudence has not discussed “contributions
to political entities unaffiliated with candidates or parties”).
172 See id. at 1102 (“[T]here can be no freestanding anti-circumvention interest.”).
2016] IF IT LOOKS LIKE A SUPER PAC 397
as well as the fact that less than half the states use individual-to-PAC contribution
limits, seems to suggest that those limits are not closely drawn to serve the government
anti-circumvention interest (let alone the anti-corruption interest).
If individual-to-PAC contribution limits could be called into question post-
McCutcheon, then limits on contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure
arm are even more suspect.173 The availability and use of more targeted anti-circum-
vention measures, and the states’ trend away from individual-to-PAC contribution
limits provide substantial reason to believe that broad, prophylactic contribution
limits on any contribution other than those made directly to a candidate are heavy-
handed and are no longer closely drawn.
III. WHY THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN KING
SHOULD DECIDE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in King provides the best guidance for resolving
the circuit split regarding how to treat limits on contributions to a hybrid PAC’s
independent-expenditure arm. The Tenth Circuit, most notably, erred on the side of
more speech.174 Compared with other circuits’ competing standards, the Tenth
Circuit’s standard better fit the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the anti-corruption
interest, acknowledged the strength of existing anti-coordination and anti-circum-
vention laws, and provided an easy-to-follow, bright-line rule.
A. King Aligns With the Supreme Court’s Modern Understanding of the Anti-
Corruption Interest
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the government may have an interest
in combatting actual corruption, apparent corruption, and circumvention of valid
limits (aimed at preventing corruption).175 In King, the Tenth Circuit discerned that
apparent corruption and circumvention concerns are necessarily derivative of the
underlying, primary government interest, actual quid pro quo corruption.176 That is,
without the potential for actual quid pro quo corruption, combatting either apparent
corruption or circumvention is neither logical nor permissible.
In King, the Tenth Circuit Court evaluated whether actual quid pro quo corrup-
tion was inherently possible within a hybrid PAC.177 The court avoided any initial
173 See supra Part II.B.2 (detailing why contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expen-
diture arm are different than contributions to a traditional PAC even if a hybrid PAC’s inde-
pendent-expenditure arm is not identically situated to a pure independent-expenditure group).
174 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“[M]ore speech, not less, is the
governing rule.”).
175 See supra Part II.A.2.
176 See King, 741 F.3d at 1102 (stating that there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention
interest).
177 See id. at 1098 (comparing a hybrid PAC with the organizations evaluated in Supreme
Court decisions like Buckley); id. at 1093–94, 1102 (discussing the anti-corruption interests
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assumption of impermissible coordination and specifically looked at how a hybrid
PAC is situated and where it could spend its money.178 First, the court determined
that hybrid PACs are differently situated than organizations that are closely affili-
ated with candidates, such as political parties.179 Though a hybrid PAC makes direct
candidate contributions, those contributions do not rise to the same level of affilia-
tion, nor do those contributions implicate the uncoordinated nature of a hybrid PAC’s
independent expenditures.180 This meshes nicely with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Citizens United, which presumes that independent expenditures are uncoordinated
and non-corrupting unless there is some additional reason to think otherwise.181
Next, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified situations in which contribu-
tions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm could lead to quid pro quo
corruption.182 The only way such corruption could occur, the court reasoned, was if
the candidate-contribution arm were to donate to a candidate using money given to
the independent-expenditure arm.183 In many jurisdictions, however, PAC-to-candidate
contributions are limited, which satisfies the anti-corruption interest.184
The King court, after examining any underlying concern of actual quid pro quo
corruption, then looked to the derivative corruption concerns: apparent corruption
and circumvention.185 Neither of the derivative concerns, however, are applicable
to contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm because the court
identified no underlying potential for actual quid pro quo corruption.186
B. King Acknowledges That More Targeted Measures to Combat Corruption Are
Less Burdensome
The Tenth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, still permits the government to combat
corruption where corruption can occur. Both courts, however, also have sought to
emphasize the importance of tailoring restrictions to avoid abridgment of speech
associated with candidate contributions and independent expenditures and holding that cor-
ruption may arise in a hybrid PAC’s candidate contributions).
178 See id. at 1101–02 (noting that hybrid PACs must adhere to base contribution limits and
anti-coordination laws, then evaluating opportunities for corruption within that framework).
179 See id. at 1098 (indicating that a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm intro-
duces an unaffiliated aspect that is not shared by the organizations in cases like McConnell).
180 See id. at 1101.
181 See id. (relating a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm to other independent-
expenditure groups under Citizens United).
182 See id. at 1102.
183 See id. (addressing the possibility for circumvention of base contribution limits).
184 See id. (“[T]here is no underlying risk of corruption since [the hybrid PAC’s] con-
tributions to candidates are controlled . . . .”).
185 See id. at 1101–02.
186 See id. at 1102 (“[T]here must be an underlying risk of corruption that justifies a
contribution limit[ ] . . . .”).
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rights.187 Perhaps most importantly, both the King court and the Supreme Court have
refused to permit broad prophylactic restrictions in situations where more targeted
measures are available.188
In evaluating limits on contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure
arm, the King Court held that PAC-to-candidate contribution limits and anti-coordi-
nation laws were sufficient to combat the potential corruption that may arise from
a hybrid PAC’s activities.189 PAC-to-candidate contribution limits prevented the
potential for circumvention, and anti-coordination laws prevented the potential for
corruption via independent expenditure coordination.190 This rationale closely mirrored
the Supreme Court’s own in Citizens United and McCutcheon.191
The notable distinction between King and those Supreme Court cases was that King
was decided on the basis of state law. That means that, significantly, both state law
and federal law have viable alternatives to broad, prophylactic contribution limits.192
C. King Provides a Bright-Line Rule
The Tenth Circuit put forth a clear legal standard in King. The court’s standard
evaluates law before facts and is presented in a way that can be applied uniformly.193
The court clearly states the law that contributions to independent-expenditure groups
do not invoke quid pro quo corruption concerns.194 Hybrid PACs are not solely
independent-expenditure groups, though, since those PACs also have candidate-
contribution arms. But allowing an independent-expenditure group to coexist with
187 See id. at 1096 n.4 (“[T]he logic of Citizens United would insist on the enforcement
of bans on coordination, rather than targeting an entire class of contributions to independent
groups.”).
188 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014) (plurality opinion) (describing
aggregate limits as “heavy-handed” in the presence of more targeted measures); King, 731
F.3d at 1101 (explaining that base contribution limits and anti-coordination laws are sufficient
to serve the government’s anti-corruption interest and less burdensome than additional prophy-
lactic contribution limits).
189 See King, 731 F.3d at 1101 (holding that base contribution limits and anti-coordination
laws are sufficient).
190 Federal anti-proliferation rules prohibiting an individual from controlling multiple
PACs also help prevent circumvention of base limits. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1439
(plurality opinion).
191 See King, 741 F.3d at 1096 n.4.
192 Though some states do not have base contribution limits, those states still would not
be justified in enacting broad, prophylactic contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s independent-
expenditure arm. Most states without base contribution limits have strict disclosure require-
ments that provide the necessary targeted measure aimed at preventing corruption. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-5-9 to -22 (West 2016) (campaign finance reporting requirements).
193 See King, 741 F.3d at 1096 n.4 (“Citizens United did not treat corruption as a fact
question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.”); cf. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2014) (focusing on the facts of a specific case in
determining that an independent-expenditure group could be subject to contribution limits).
194 See King, 741 F.3d at 1095.
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a candidate-contribution group does not suddenly change the underlying principles
that govern either.195
Contributions to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm do not pose unique
corruption concerns simply because of the hybrid PAC’s structure. Both circumven-
tion and coordination were concerns before hybrid PACs existed, and hybrid PACs
must abide by the existing safeguards targeted at preventing circumvention and
coordination.196 The King court stands by the notion that contributions to a hybrid
PAC’s independent-expenditure arm are not inherently suspect.197
Since hybrid PACs are not inherently more likely to be corrupting, they need
only maintain separate accounts for their candidate-contribution and independent-
expenditure arms and abide by the same restrictions as any other similarly situated
PAC.198 Corruption concerns would only arise if a hybrid PAC impermissibly
coordinated or violated base contribution limits.
D. The Second Circuit’s Holding in Sorrell Allows Too Much Judicial Discretion
and Will Create an Impermissible Speech Gap
The Second Circuit’s competing standard put forth in Sorrell is heavily fact-
based and perpetuates the use of unnecessarily broad prophylactic contribution limits.
The Second Circuit’s factual evaluation of independent-expenditure groups is in
opposition to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Citizens United, which held that
independent expenditures, categorically, were uncoordinated and non-corrupting.199
Because independent expenditures are not the type of speech that pose a corruption risk,
no corruption risk exists to be evaluated unless that independence is lost through direct
candidate contribution or coordination with a candidate (or a closely affiliated group).200
195 See id. at 1101 (combining two non-corrupting activities does not increase the chance
for corruption).
196 See id. (base contribution limits and anti-coordination laws satisfy the government’s
anti-corruption interest).
197 See id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)) (“[I]ndependent
expenditures are by definition uncoordinated . . . and cannot lead to the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption.”).
198 See id. at 1097 (citing Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131–32 (D.D.C. 2011))
(indicating that a hybrid PAC does not violate candidate contribution restrictions if that hybrid
PAC maintains segregated accounts for its different arms).
199 See id. at 1096 n.4 (“Citizens United did not treat corruption as a fact question to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.”); cf. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d
118, at 142–43 (2d Cir. 2014) (focusing on the facts of a specific case in determining that an
independent-expenditure group could be subject to contribution limits).
200 See supra Part III.A (discussing how a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is
not inherently non-independent because the independent-expenditure arm is, by definition,
uncoordinated with the candidate-contribution arm, and the candidate-contribution arm is not
inherently closely affiliated with a candidate).
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The Sorrell court also failed to recognize the broad implication of its ruling.
Although contribution limits may have been a proper remedy for the specific violation
in Sorrell, such broad, prophylactic limits are far too burdensome in light of other
more targeted measures. More importantly, those contribution limits existed before
Sorrell was decided, meaning that the court failed to address the obviously overbroad
law that led to the issue in the first place. If the law had been ruled unconstitutional
as applied to independent-expenditure groups—as Citizens United would seem to
encourage—then the independent-expenditure group in Sorrell still may have vio-
lated anti-circumvention or anti-coordination laws. An overbroad law is not justified
simply because its application happens to lead to a favorable outcome.
CONCLUSION
In 2012, Politico quoted attorney Dan Backer as saying, “Any PAC that doesn’t
become a hybrid PAC is run by idiots. The default is going to be hybrid PACs[.]”201
Backer, who had successfully argued Carey v. FEC only a year earlier,202 had good
reason to believe hybrid PACs would become the new norm. As vehicles for political
speech, hybrid PACs are unrivaled—combining the elements of both traditional and
super PACs under one roof. Hybrid PACs, however, still have not even remotely
come close to the fundraising power of super PACs.203
Perhaps the most likely reason why hybrid PACs have not become the default
PAC is because of the legal uncertainty that surrounds them. Hybrid PACs were the
creation of a district court decision204 and have been subject to varying restrictions
across the federal circuits. Certain decisions permitting contribution limits on a hybrid
PAC’s independent-expenditure arm undoubtedly have a chilling effect on political
speech that should be protected. Though the government’s anti-corruption interest
is certainly valid, that interest is not all-powerful.
Any turn in the battle between the government’s anti-corruption interest and First
Amendment political speech rights predominantly rests on the political inclinations
201 Dave Levinthal, Meet the Super Super PAC, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2012, 12:33 PM), http:
//www.politico.com/story/2012/01/meet-the-super-super-pac-071763 [http://perma.cc/6M3E
-BDPW].
202 Id.
203 See Julie Bykowicz & Chad Day, Presidential Super PACs Lost Steam in Second Half
of 2015, AP (Feb. 1, 2016, 4:24 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/47a715b4f7ea4ec8a63917
bad0a228de/presidential-super-pacs-lost-steam-second-half-2015 [http://perma.cc/M6Q5
-HXAP] (noting that Jeb Bush’s super PAC alone raised $103 million in the first half of
2015); Alex Lazar, Hybrid PACs Collectively Beat Fundraising Records of Past Election
Cycles, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.opensecrets.org/news
/2015/08/hybrid-pacs-collectively-beat-fundraising-records-of-past-election-cycles/ [http://
perma.cc/6526-RXB7] (indicating that hybrid PACs collectively raised about $11.3 million
in the first half of 2015).
204 See Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d. 121 (D.D.C. 2011).
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of the Supreme Court Justices. With the passing of Justice Scalia, the Court’s political
direction is no longer as certain as when McCutcheon was decided. The next Supreme
Court Justice could influence campaign finance in much the same way that Justice
Scalia did for nearly three decades, but the direction of that influence could substan-
tially change contribution limit jurisprudence.
What is true now, however, is that independent expenditures are considered uncoor-
dinated and non-corrupting. In the absence of corruption there is no government
interest sufficient to warrant either expenditure or contribution limits. Regardless of
the next Justice, the Court will likely hesitate to immediately overturn that precedent.
A hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm is, by definition, uncoordinated and
non-corrupting. Contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm
should be treated the same as limits on the equally independent super PACs, that is,
those limits should be deemed entirely unconstitutional. Some argue that the closeness
of a hybrid PAC’s candidate-contribution and independent-expenditure elements
creates a situation ripe for impermissible coordination and circumvention, but that
argument simply does not hold up. Hybrid PACs are subject to the same base limits and
anti-coordination laws as separated traditional and super PACs. Those more targeted
provisions already serve to prevent impermissible coordination and circumvention.
Broad, prophylactic contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure
arm are heavy-handed and substantially mismatched to the government’s underlying
anti-corruption interest.
The Tenth Circuit stands by the notion that contribution limits on a hybrid PAC’s
independent-expenditure arm are unduly burdensome, and the court’s decision in
King should decide the circuit split. Unlike the Second Circuit, which is on the
opposite side of the split, the Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence aligns with the Supreme
Court’s modern understanding of the anti-corruption interest and provides a bright-line
rule for determining the legal question of whether contribution limits may be applied
to a hybrid PAC’s independent-expenditure arm. The Second Circuit’s decision in
Sorrell, alternatively, allows too much judicial discretion and will create an imper-
missible speech gap.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court declared that independent expenditures
did not pose a corruption risk, yet some courts still claim otherwise. Direct candidate
contributions, however, certainly can pose a corruption risk, and that is why base
contribution limits long have been relatively uncontroversial. Hybrid PACs can
contribute to candidates and also make independent expenditures, two functions that,
independently, are undeniably permissible. The only truly defining characteristic of
a hybrid PAC is its efficiency; hybrid PACs do not develop an emergent property of
corruption simply by existing. Hybrid PACs can become the default PAC, but first
the courts need to get out of the way. For hybrid PACs to truly become the preemi-
nent, highly efficient vehicle of political speech, broad, prophylactic contribution
limits must be barred in favor of the more targeted measures that are less burden-
some on the cornerstone of our First Amendment rights, the right to freely engage
in political speech.
